WORKING PAPERS AND WORK IN PROGRESS

On the exhaustible-resource monopsony (with Matti Liski) (July 2011).

Forward trading in exhaustible-resource oligopoly (with Matti Liski) (January, 2012).

The effect of transport policies on car use: Theory and evidence from Latin American cities (with Francisco Gallego and Christian Salas) (October, 2011).

Multimarket contact, price discrimination, and collusive behavior (with Esperanza Johnson).


PUBLISHED AND FORTHCOMING PAPERS

A note on environmental policy and innovation when governments cannot commit Energy Economics 33(1): S13-S19 (2011).

Market power in an exhaustible resource market: The case of storable pollution permits (with Matti Liski) The Economic Journal, Volume 121, Issue 551, pages 116–144, (2011).

Output-enhancing collusion in the presence of a competitive fringe (with Juan Ignacio Guzmán) Journal of Industrial Economics, 58, 106-126 (2010).

Market power in pollution permit markets, The Energy Journal 30, 115-142 (2009).

A simple auction mechanism for the optimal allocation of the commons, American Economic Review 98, 496-518 (2008).

The efficiency and robustness of allowance banking in the US Acid Rain Program (with Denny Ellerman) The Energy Journal, 28, 47-61 (2007). (Distinguished with the Campbell Watkins Award for best paper in The Energy Journal in 2007)

An Auction Mechanism in a Climate Change Architecture. In R. Stavins and J. Aldy, eds., Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World. Cambridge University Press (2007).

Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly, (with Matti Liski) Journal of Economic Theory 131, 212-230 (2006).

Tradable permits with imperfect monitoring: Evidence from Santiago’s particulate permits market In J. Freeman and C. Kolstad, eds., Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation: Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience. UK: Oxford University Press (2006).

On pollution permit banking and market power (with Matti Liski), Journal of Regulatory Economics 29 ,283-302 (2006)

Pollution markets with imperfectly observed emissions, RAND Journal of Economics 36, 645-660 (2005).Reprinted in Economics of Environmental Law, edited by Richard Brooks, Nathaniel O.Keohane, and Douglas A. Kysar, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2008.

A model of final-offer arbitration in regulation, Journal of Regulatory Economics 28, 23-46 (2005).

A note on market power in an emission permits market with banking (with Matti Liski), Environmental and Resource Economics 31,159-173 (2005).

Notas para una regulación eficiente de la transmisión eléctrica (with Salvador Valdés), Cuadernos de Economia 41, 255-283 (2004).

Markets for environmental protection: Design and performance, Estudios de Economia 31, 79-99 (2004).

Is it possible to move the copper market? (with Matti Liski), Cuadernos de Economia 40, 559-565 (2003).

Second-generation electricity reforms in Latin America and the California paradigm (with Hugh Rudnick), Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 2, 159-172 (2002).

Market structure and environmental innovation, Journal of Applied Economics 5, 293-325 (2002).

Permits, standards, and technology innovation, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44, 23-44 (2002).

Prices vs. quantities with incomplete enforcement, Journal of Public Economics 85, 435-454 (2002).

A market-based environmental policy experiment in Chile (with J.M Sánchez and R. Katz), Journal of Law and Economics 45, 267-287 (2002).

Multipollutant markets, RAND Journal of Economics 32, 762-774 (2001).

Crisis eléctrica en California: Algunas lecciones para Chile (with J.M. Sánchez), Estudios Públicos 83, 139-162 (2001).

Policies, measures and instruments (with Peter Bohn, Robert Stavins et al), in Climate Change 2001: Mitigation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, Chapter 6, 399-450 (2001)

Precios eléctricos flexibles (with Hugh Rudnick), Cuadernos de Economía 38, 91-109 (2001).

Análisis del Mercado de Material Particulado en Santiago (with J.M Sánchez and R. Katz), Estudios Públicos 81, 177-203 (2001).

Economía política del cambio climático en Chile (with L. Cifuentes and F. Soto), Estudios de Economía 27, 69-93 (2000).

An interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading (with R. Schmalensee, P. Joskow, A. D. Ellerman, and E. M. Bailey) in R.N. Stavins (ed.), Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings, 4th Edition, W.W. Norton's, (2000).

Optimal design of a phase-in emissions trading program, Journal of Public Economics 75, 273-291 (2000).

Voluntary compliance with market-based environmental policy: Evidence from the US Acid Rain Program, Journal of Political Economy 107, 998-1033 (1999).

Summary evaluation of the US S02 Emissions Trading Program as implemented in 1995 (with A.D. Ellerman, R. Schmalensee, P. Joskow, and E.M. Bailey), in S. Sorrell and J. Skea (eds.), Pollution for Sale: Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK (1999).

Optimal opt-in “climate” contracts, Journal of Applied Economics 1, 363-384 (1998).

The declining trend in sulfur dioxide emissions: Implications for allowance prices (with A.D. Ellerman), Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 36, 26-45 (1998).

An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading (with R. Schmalensee, P. Joskow, A. D. Ellerman, and E.M. Bailey), Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 53-68 (1998).

Marketable pollution permits with uncertainty and transaction costs, Resource and Energy Economics 20, 27-49 (1998).